

Anti-Capitalism Within and Beyond Capitalism: The Gramscian Bridge Between Anti-Power and Statocentric Theories of Left Political Contestation

Onur Acaroglu

Anti-power theories in the Marxist paradigm seek to overcome the traditional emphasis on the capture of political power by identifying alternative revolutionary subjectivities beyond the working class and modes of localized, decentred political contestation that circumvent power relations and implement social change within the interstices of capitalist society. This tendency is in stark contrast with the conventional Leninist goal of capturing political power through the historical agency of a vanguard party. This investigation, however, seeks to show that the boundaries between these two paradigms are more porous than they tend to be portrayed, and that the methodical precision and democratic centralism of the Leninist party could deepen the understanding of how experimentation in alternative societies gets subdued, or conversely, what the main reasons for their resiliency are. On a strategic level, the Gramscian concept of hegemony provides a useful nexus between the aspects of war of position and war of manoeuvre on both sides of the debate. It is proposed that hegemonic struggle to counter the bombardment of capitalist ideology spans both political struggle to prevail in the state, as well as the counterhegemonic models of organizing social life that do not involve overtly statocentric goals. Firstly, an account of the genesis of the 'statocentric' paradigm is surveyed, giving due attention to Lenin's formulations of state power, and this is contrasted with an outline of anti-power theories beginning from autonomist standpoints and leading to the recent proposal of John Holloway to *Change the World Without Taking Power* (2002). The latter part covers a discussion of the multifaceted concept of hegemony in Gramsci, which sets the stage for a substantive comparative analysis of the two paradigms, mainly from a theoretical angle but also taking strides into historical examples where pertinent. The intention is to bridge the gulf that separates Lenin from Holloway without losing sight of particularities in each paradigm but also advancing the thesis that pockets of anti-capitalism within the capitalist maelstrom could only overcome market imperatives by complementing the direct transformation of social relations with the overall cohesion and political focus found in Lenin's theoretical practice.

Introduction: Power and Anti-Power

The strategic primacy of the state has been taken for granted in emancipatory politics. One could argue that this is understandable given the leverage political power provides to influence social relations. This, however, poses a dilemma for forces that seek to pass

beyond society dominated by capitalistic interest; the state appears to be an indispensable apparatus for the perpetuation of existing social relations, while being a slanted terrain of social struggles. A strand of contemporary 'anti-power' theories deny the centrality of the state, identifying the loci of the reproduction of capitalist social relations across social reality as a whole. The class struggles that derive from these relations permeate the production process, traversing mundane aspects of daily life as well as cataclysmic historical moments. Strategies formulated with this theoretical approach seek to keep the state apparatus at a distance while creating vestiges of alternative societies in the present, often in autonomous zones where utopian prefiguration is concretized. Given the dispersion of state functions such as welfare and security into private channels, and states increasingly taking on repressive functions in their place, the puzzle of social movements with an autonomistic and anti-power bent is their efficacy in puncturing holes in state power while evincing a frail sustainability, and an inability to generalize their social base on a larger scale.

Anti-power theories emphasize acts of refusal. They take a negative attitude to political contestation, proceeding from a denial and deepening the rupture, 'the scream' as Holloway calls it (2002: 1). This paradigm is perhaps best explained as an attitude rather than a series of provisional positions. Theoretical justifications taken up by authors of this persuasion bank on the disarming effect of the counterintuitive and unpredictable nature of alternative modes of politicization. In this sense such theories of action can offer the chutzpah elemental to any intransigence. Although, it is also pertinent to consider the day after, and particularly whether traditional, 'confrontational' strategies epitomized in the Leninist conquest could assist in establishing a continuity to the open-ended, always unfolding process of social restructuring. It would also be rash to jettison Lenin's expansion of the territorial domain of Marxism towards political practice in less capitalistically developed countries with the theory of the vanguard party. The Bolsheviks achieved the first socialist revolution, regardless of whether one sees it as a putsch that only switched the regime or as a social sea change. Crucially, Gramsci indicates this was a 'Revolution against 'Capital'', in that the circumstances were far removed from those that Marx scrutinized in his landmark critique of political economy, articulated meticulously in chapters pertaining to the working day (Gramsci 1917; Marx 1990: 340-411).

Gramsci was able to grasp the way political contestation is embedded within an ensemble of social relations where the base and superstructure exist in a dialectical unity, the mode of production being reproduced along multiple vectors with varying overdetermining intensity based on historical peculiarities. This insight is in itself a revolutionary assertion against mechanistic unidirectional determinism. It allows for an appreciation of the subversive elements in both anti-power and statocentric archetypes, marking the plausibility of political contestation that does not necessarily index its achievements under reactions from and gains against the state, but nevertheless meets it on its own ground to reveal its ultimately coercive and narrowly class-based nature.

The Gramscian concept of hegemony could bridge the gulf between statocentric and anti-power theories, emphasizing a strength of overall cohesion and ‘war of manoeuvre’ on the side of the former and one of counterhegemonic audacity and ‘war of position’ on the latter. This would involve the capture of the state while retaining the creative spontaneity championed by anti-power theorists. Firstly, an account of the genesis of the ‘statocentric’ paradigm will be surveyed, giving due attention to Lenin’s formulations of state power, and this will be contrasted with an outline of anti-power theories beginning from autonomist standpoints and leading to the recent proposal of John Holloway to *Change the World Without Taking Power* (2002). The latter part will cover a discussion of the multifaceted concept of hegemony in Gramsci, which will set the stage for a substantive comparative analysis of the two paradigms, mainly from a theoretical angle but also taking strides into historical examples where pertinent.

The Post-war Anti-Power Turn

In debates within the Marxist paradigm, the pivotal place of the state as a unique social institution with agency in shaping social life arguably dates to the Bernstein-Luxemburg debate, where both sides acknowledge the capture of state power as the primary task of revolutionary political action while disagreeing on the functionality of the state in capitalist society and the exigency of its subsequent overthrow (Bernstein 1907; Luxemburg 1986). State power as an objective to be captured, as one of the prime nodes of the social formation that regulates and reproduces class society, was subsequently formulated explicitly by Lenin in *What is to be Done?* (1902). In this pamphlet Lenin challenged the social democratic separation of the political and the economic, respectively culminating in counterproductive paths of reformism and economism. The Bolshevik leader suggests a vanguard to spread political awareness among the working class and link trade union and political struggles with the ultimate aim of a frontal assault on the state. The social-democratic and communist split was the defining distinction on the Left, crystallizing with bureaucratic ossification of the Soviet Union under Stalin, while the ravages of fascism shattered expectations for existing and as-yet-absent socialisms.

The crisis of strategy stems from the perceived complicity of traditional working class political and trade union organizations in post-war Western Europe, where welfare states appeared to absorb working class political militancy and dampen its intransigent potential in a social democratic class compromise. There is thus a tendency among contemporary critical theorists to shift the *modus operandi* of anti-systemic socio-political struggle to more ‘indirect’ channels (Hardt and Negri 2001: 210, Holloway 2002, Virno 2004). Deleuze asserts in this statement the position of this doctrine: “To flee, but in fleeing to seek a weapon” (Deleuze and Parnet 1987). It is for this reason that the Bartleby character in Melville’s short story *Bartleby the Scrivener*,

who responds to every command and request with a lethargic “I would prefer not to”, has been treated as a paragon of circumventing power relations and dazzling the authority which finds itself powerless against a non-confrontational rival (Deleuze 1998; Žižek 2006).

Towards a Gramscian Mediation

The contrast between these approaches yields a creative tension, destabilizing dichotomies of discipline-spontaneity, political-economic, and stasis-ecstasy. The Gramscian conceptual repository could be used to capitalize on this tension by introducing hegemonic struggle as a nexus between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ modes of political contestation.

The term hegemony was not first used by Gramsci, as it figured widely in Russian revolutionary discourse earlier with reference to political dominance and class alliance based on short term calculations, but Gramsci was the first to make a sustained engagement and systematic application (Anderson 1976). Responding to developments in Western Europe and the failure of socialist revolutions to materialize, Gramsci reflected on the viewpoints, mores and dispositions of thinking that naturalize and reproduce capitalist society, despite its vagaries and disastrous inclinations. For this reason, the theoretician advocates a political line that takes into account the cultivation of democratic situations that defy established societal frames, facilitating alternative modes of thinking and existence within the interstices of capitalist society.

Considering such subtleties in relatively stabilized liberal democratic societies is vital for a differential study of the mechanisms of bourgeois political power. This, as Gramsci recognized, poses a different set of problems for practice than it does in countries like Tsarist Russia. Here the hegemony of the ruling class was not as diffuse and power was concentrated in the state, making clandestine activity an imperative, still remaining vulnerable to mobilization along lines of ‘war of manoeuvre’. Thus, Gramsci does not advocate a uniform line of action for every context, and looks with optimism to novel forms of political contestation and governance, such as the Soviets or the factory councils in Italy, which flourished during the *biennio rosso* of 1918-1919 and the following mass occupations of 1920 (1919a; 1919b; 1919c; 1919d; 1921).

The organizational open-mindedness of Gramsci’s political theory is the reason behind the seemingly contradictory definitions of hegemony implicit in his writings. The local, empirical content informs the use of the term, making it transferable to different contexts while avoiding conceptual reification. The continuum of strategies suggested take the capture of state power as an objective, differing in terms of the immediacy of this task. However, the conception of hegemony can be extended to theories that advocate the avoidance of state power, in ways that challenge inherent limitations on both sides of the debate. Thus the intention here is to attempt a Gramscian bridge between the gulf that separates Lenin from Holloway without losing

sight of central particularities in each paradigm. This paper advances the thesis that pockets of anti-capitalism within the capitalist maelstrom could only overcome market imperatives in favour of democratic planning by complementing the direct transformation of social relations with the overall cohesion and political focus found in Lenin's theoretical practice. Lenin's propositions must in turn be reformulated to adapt to heterogeneous circumstances. Regarding adaptability, the title of the volume *Lenin Reloaded* captures the need for an 'update' as a precondition of Leninism. An allusion is made to the need to 'repeat' Lenin in line with the maxim Lukacs invokes to describe the culmination of theory where it spills over into practice: "concrete analysis of the concrete situation" (Budgen, Kouvelakis and Zizek 2007; Lukacs 1970).

The 'Orthodoxy'

Marx founded a new science: the science of history. Let me use an image. The sciences we are familiar with have been installed in a number of great 'continents'. Before Marx, two such continents had been opened up to scientific knowledge: the continent of Mathematics and the continent of Physics. The first by the Greeks (Thales), the second by Galileo. Marx opened up a third continent to scientific knowledge: the continent of History. Louis Althusser (1971)

The founders of Marxism did not develop a pristine, self-enclosed theoretical orientation, but sought to create a science of the study of particular social contradictions within the totality of dynamic unity of processes that reproduce social differentiation. Such a monumental endeavour necessarily involves coming to terms with the dichotomy of theory and practice, which Marx entwines in the eleventh thesis on Feuerbach: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it" (1969). Marx and Engels studied and assimilated the intellectual and political accumulation of emancipatory struggles and integrated their perceptions and interventions into the political climate to their philosophical outlook, formulating a philosophy of praxis, or theoretically informed practice that contains the standards of its own verification and points beyond the state of affairs. While Lenin's theory of the political party, mobilized on the premise of the actuality of revolution, undeniably refined Marxian theory, political activism was inherent to begin with. The writings of Marx and Engels testify that their theories went through changes with particular moments of turmoil. These points of historical torsion account for the 'continent' Marxism traverses, not as an externally imposed model of comprehending the social universe, but a reflexive theory that does not immediately reduce theoretical developments to historic events while remaining capable of accounting for its own genesis as a science of history.

This also marks a new horizon in scientific method. Firstly, the dialectical approach of achieving knowledge echoes the Enlightenment-inspired idea that the universe is knowable, but refrains from the triumphalist assumption that the

unknowable will be eventually, and definitively, conquered. This paradigm defies the positivistic fetishism of observation and experiment, along with the disdain for theorization and philosophy. It denounces the illusion of externally assessing reality, advocating the idea that knowledge can be gained by a combination of theoretical abstraction and direct engagement. Based on this conceptual grasp of Marxism, it is pertinent to view the political practice of its founders in unity with their theories on social continuity and revolutionary rupture. For this reason, the label of 'orthodox' regarding Marxian political practice of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries seems, at the least, to be an awkward designation, as singling out a particular period of 'orthodoxy' implies an understanding of Marxism as a lifeless article of faith.

Marxism and the Praxis of Marx and Engels

The twin craters of the revolutionary eruption in Europe were the economic transformation of Britain and the political conflagration in France following 1792 (Hobsbawm 1962: 17). Both of these processes involved popular masses in social-political affairs in an unprecedented scale. The Industrial Revolution received a *prima facie* ambiguous reaction from Marx. He observed that while technical innovations in production showed the human capacity to create the means to live in prosperity and eradicate suffering, the productive capacity unleashed took the productive component - the toiling humanity - under its yoke, such that exorbitant increases in fortunes was accompanied by back-breaking labour and starvation, along with periodic crises. The utter social dislocation also showed the capacity of the bourgeoisie to dismantle the previous order with cold efficiency (1969: 15). This contradiction of immense hardship in the midst of thriving productivity, coupled with the jubilation of the 1848 Revolutions that convulsed the continent, inspired the writer of the *Communist Manifesto* to assert that the subterranean class struggle had broken out into open revolution, "(...) where the violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie lays the foundation for the sway of the proletariat" (1969: 20). It should be kept in mind that these lines were written with the purpose of agitation, but nevertheless it also shows that while Marx had a clear vision of the proletarian capacity to take up the reins of its own livelihood, he did not explicitly elaborate how this could come about. Over the course of the political lives of both Marx and Engels, in fact, there is an openness to organizational experimentation and a modest acknowledgement of forms of politicization improvised at the ground level of social struggle.

The other corollary of the tectonic shifts in the socio-economic order was the political and ideological inaugurations of revolutionary France. While the Industrial Revolution largely configured the global economic system, shaping the infrastructural terrain of social struggle, the French Revolution created new political models and objectives for discontented masses. While militarily French preponderance was decisively thwarted with Napoleon's defeat in Waterloo and ensuing restoration, a

relentless social movement in the barricades erupted in July 1830 in Paris. This attested to the possibility that the programmatic slogans of the French Revolution could be repossessed by a democratic majority of social actors, and directed towards the transformation of the state with a view to implementing egalitarian measures in political as well as socio-economic domains towards a consistently 'social' republic. In terms of its constituents and methods of struggle there was a decidedly proletarian character to the July Uprising and state power was paralysed by the heterogeneous mass presence in the streets. While this uprising had a short lifespan with the instalment of Louis Philippe, 1830 was an effective challenge against the monarchy and a telling sign of struggles to come. 1848 was emboldened by this confidence and consciousness. All in all, the cycle of revolution and restoration between 1815 and 1848 polarized the sides of revolution and order, embroiling a broad swathe of artisans, workers, the urban poor, students and intellectuals in a political struggle that showed that toppling age-old rulers and improving living conditions were feasible through concerted effort.

From a Marxian viewpoint, while this period saw the gradual waning of the progressive impulse of the bourgeoisie that was wavering towards an alliance with the aristocracy and the monarchy, it was still stamped by a programmatically democratic agenda. The strategic conundrum was thus the question of articulating a distinctly working class political line. A preliminary attempt at creating an international revolutionary organization was the Fraternal Democrats who professed in their Declaration of Principles as follows: "(...) we regard kings, aristocracies and classes monopolizing privileges in virtue of their possession of property, as usurpers. Governments elected by and responsible to the entire people is our political creed" (1951: 402). Marx and Engels had been aware of this short-lived organization without direct participation. The broad statement would have been agreeable to a reader with bourgeois-liberal sympathies and a socialist alike, thus it could be considered as more of a procedural organization of theoretical debate, but it nevertheless indicated a political target and goal.

The first international movement with a clear socialist perspective was the Communist League where Marx and Engels were active. Article I was remarkably more precise: "The aim of the league is the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, the rule of the proletariat, the abolition of the old bourgeois society which rests on the antagonism of classes, and the foundation of a new society without classes and without private property" (Engels and Marx 1847). The two aspects that this hints at about Marx's political vision are that firstly, this organization was based in London but incorporated the working classes of all major countries, including migrant workers settled in countries foreign to their origin. This attests to the way that nomadization, while not overtly theorised, figured in the formulation of political strategy of internationalist socialism. Secondly, this organization implicated a looser 'league' with common principles. However, it is anachronistic to expect the formation of a political party in the

contemporary sense, as parliamentary politics were still in a gelatinous state. It is noteworthy that Marx was focused on the journal of the League, *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, and wrote extensively on working class political action. This may have arisen from the realization that while the League was tenuously connected to masses of working people, the journal continually checked the pulse of social movements and interacted with the working class, particularly during the tumultuous 1848. In fact, Engels would write that “The few hundred League members vanished in the enormous mass that had been suddenly hurled into the movement”, whereas the journal remained relevant (Engels 1848). The League, which produced important theoretical work for the proletarian struggle against both aristocratic and bourgeois preponderance, would formally dissolve after the Cologne Communist Trial, by which time it had become politically defunct due to internal strife.

From an opposite class perspective, de Tocqueville had astutely observed that the failure of the revolutionary wave of 1848 to materialize into a political authority could be attributed to the lack of an organized will to assume power (1896: 111). This analysis also figured in Marx’s view that a mass party of the working class beyond the feebly organized Communist League would be necessary to capitalize on the revolutionary situation where the ruling class is unable to rule and the dominated classes show an ecstatic discontent. This laid the foundation for the establishment of the First International in the 1860s, spanning all countries and incorporating working class organizations across a variety of persuasions. Unlike the previous attempts at political unity, however, the General Council used executive powers to coordinate struggles, anticipating a form of centralism.

The thunderclap of the 1848 upheavals had impelled Marx to advocate a sharper differentiation from the bourgeois revolutionary tradition, underlining the fact that once the traditional dominant class had been removed from the historical scene, the bourgeoisie would turn to a reactionary position vis-à-vis the working class (1968: 182). Furthermore, the continuation of the revolution towards establishing proletarian political power would be a requisite for expropriating and politically marginalizing all property owning classes (Marx 1968: 178-179). This diagnosis leads to the (in)famous idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the transitional phase where the continual unfolding of the revolution is maintained, undoing the social relations and concomitant ideological configurations of the previous epoch (1968: 282). The strategy of proletarian dictatorship made up the horizon of socialist struggle along Marxist lines, but this did not signify a rigid dogmatism. On the contrary, Marx’s outlook on the dictatorship of the proletariat suggests a holistic practice of political power that problematizes distinctions between the economic and political domains of society. The two are combined with a view to take up the reins of the production process under democratically elected bodies of local decision-making. This diffusion of power subordinates higher echelons of political organization and state authority to the bottom and fundamentally extends enfranchisement and empowerment among working

people. This revolutionary endeavour, if it is to be consistent, necessarily has to avoid fetishizing a form of political contestation and remain cognizant of the innovative methods and organizations against commodity fetishism and exploitation that flourish from the spontaneous creativity of the dispossessed and marginalized.

In this regard, the foundation of the Paris Commune, which took place outside the initiative of the First International, deeply impacted Marxist theories of the state and proletarian dictatorship. Notwithstanding its mere seventy days in power and bloody defeat, the fact that the Commune could be implemented was first and foremost a beacon of the feasibility of a model of governance that effectively instituted an egalitarianism inscribed in the election of all officials and the right to recall. Additionally, the defeat of the Commune was instructive on a number of levels regarding the strategic importance of the capture of state power as a definitive way of dislodging reaction and opening the path for socialist construction. The absence of a provisional programme, neglect of the rest of the country, weaknesses in centralized coordination and wedges between different political groups, along with the crucial mistake of disregarding the reaction regrouping for an energized assault from Versailles could be listed as issues that merited individual scrutiny, although this risks lapsing into a dry counterfactual history practice. Instead the Commune may be viewed as an open resource to draw from, and this seems to be the impression of Marx as well.

In a preface to the *Manifesto* Marx would remark that certain sections would be substantially revised had it been written at that time, drawing from the experience of the Commune: “The working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery, and wield it for its own purposes” (Marx and Engels 1872; Marx 1871). This was a momentous judgment, showing that the Empire could not be maintained alongside its antithesis, the Commune. The functions and institutions of the representative parliamentary system, along with the repressive apparatus, were made redundant through self-governance. The Commune was an ontological threat to the Empire; it disrupted and supplanted the social flow of capitalist exploitation and dispelled its veneer of democratic representation by revealing its coercive core. For Marx, this meant that a simultaneous process of destruction and reconstruction was required to maintain the Communal experience: “The unity of the nation was not to be broken, but, on the contrary, to be organized by Communal Constitution, and to become a reality by the destruction of the state power which claimed to be the embodiment of that unity independent of, and superior to, the nation itself, from which it was but a parasitic excrescence” (1871). This judgment contradicts a hasty interpretation along libertarian lines that emancipation can only be achieved by direct, unmediated working-class action; it implies the coordination of a conscious antagonism vis-à-vis the state and organizational mediation between self-governing producers and the forces of the *ancien régime*.

After the Commune, Marx and Engels promoted the construction of independent national workers’ parties, without privileging a schematic arrangement (Johnstone

1967). It appears that the experience of the Communist League showed that a narrow, illegal organization gathered around programmatic points could not embrace the masses and would lapse into sectarian irrelevance. The tendency from this point onwards, however, was the search for a unity not in theory, but in movement, as Marx and Engels found it appropriate to include Bakunin's group to compete for influence in the International, despite their insoluble differences (Engels 1872). However, as their divergences were more organizational than theoretical, Bakunin and his group's resistance against drives for a degree of centralization resulted in Bakunin's expulsion in 1872. Be that as it may, Marx and Engels' efforts to build a cohesive and effective force able to make interventions in the working class movement were not endorsed by major sections in the International, and its activity dwindled in the 1870s.

At this stage the prospect of a political party in the contemporary sense as a contender for political power along electoral or revolutionary means became topical. The 1875 Gotha programme was drafted as a blueprint for a party of the working class, and although Marx and Engels severely criticized this programme, they saw the unification of the working class as a precondition for the very formation of a class-conscious proletariat (Marx 1875). This indicates a dialectic of mutual formation where the class and the party reinforce and streamline the composition of one another.

Engels wrote that there are distinct theoretical and working class movements, reflecting that the *Communist Manifesto* integrated the communist currents of the French working-class and the "collapse of Hegelian philosophy" completed by Marx (Engels 1892). In Engels' view the theoretical developments are inspired by the course of the working-class movement. The constitution of the working class as a class for itself cannot but find its concretization in the party, which is in turn structurally conditioned by theoretical underpinnings. This is a significant yet overlooked instigation of a wider debate on the relationship between the party and non-Marxists subjectivities. It is also in contrast to the severing of the continuity between the theoretical movement and the class struggle by Lenin, where interpenetration and qualitative difference is emphasized at the expense of overlapping continuity.

Lenin's Theory of the Vanguard Party

It is crucial to emphasise that for Marx or Lenin, who are both in agreement on this point, the real characteristic of the party is not its firmness, but rather its porosity to the event, its dispersive flexibility in the face of unforeseeable circumstances. Alain Badiou (2005: 74)

A major disagreement between the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks was premised on a basic agreement that Russia was headed in a direction of bourgeois revolution, which would overthrow or emasculate the Tsardom and set out on a private property and market-oriented trajectory. Based on this, both sides drew different conclusions with regard to the working class and the state, 'hegemony' being the operative concept that

characterized the Bolshevik position. The Mensheviks believed that Russia needed to go through a phase of 'democratic revolution' under the aegis of the bourgeoisie, and the role of the proletariat during this phase was to provide active support to push the bourgeoisie to take further steps. On the other hand, Lenin and the Bolsheviks argued - echoing the observations of Marx and Engels regarding the retrograde step of post-revolutionary bourgeoisie - that the active presence of the working class would be anathema to bourgeois interests. Consequently, unless the democratic revolution took place within the socialist revolution through a working class-peasantry alliance under proletarian hegemony, the ascendant working class would be immediately subdued following a bourgeois consolidation of power (Lenin 1962b: 293-303).

The Leninist faction believed the topicality of socialism could be achieved with uninterrupted revolutionary transition, where the democratic and socialist revolutions would overlap and the latter would overtake the former. This was the crux of Bolshevik strategy that relegated the bourgeois revolution to a secondary position and focused on the Soviets. The general economy of violence engulfed the first decades of the twentieth century, and Lenin's main enterprise was to consider the transformation of this turbulent situation to organized collective action and constitutive power. The will to combine the organization of the diffuse collective power and the capture of the state within the tasks of the party characterized Lenin's vision of political practice as an inherently dynamic post-capitalist configuration with precise objectives and targets.

The question of political power is central to the Leninist project of transition, based on the understanding that a vacuum is bound to be filled at times of turmoil, and thus the context of uncertainty should be considered as an opportunity to grasp power and direct it to enabling democratic mass participation. This is because historically, flagrantly reactionary forces or more progressive bourgeois revolutionary organization have prevailed when the amorphous working class upheaval lacked a coherent sense of purpose and a clearly articulated legality of leadership. The lack of such overarching programmatic goals and political representation could have otherwise oriented upheavals it towards the capture, subsumption and disaggregation of the state under the political-cultural hegemony of the popular classes.

It is an oft-repeated misrepresentation that Lenin equated militaristic incursion with the socialist political agenda. Lih meticulously demonstrates in an historical study of the vanguard strategy that the organizational form advocated in *What is to be Done?* was not a panacea, a perennially effective arrangement, but a provisional insurrectionary adaptation viewed as a prerequisite for survival (Lih 2005; Lenin 1902: 81-98). Lih maintains that this work belonged to a particular moment in the development of the Bolshevik Party which was a milestone in the maturation of Lenin's view of the party but nevertheless did not remain as a rigid frame of reference. He argues in a subtle and involved way that the faulty translations of core words and phrases into English have led to confusion and even to readers drawing the opposite conclusions to what Lenin had intended to convey. Many pages are thus devoted to

explaining that the word *stikhiinyi*, when translated as spontaneity, distorts his views; how *konspiratsiia* does not mean ‘conspiracy’; *tred-iunionizm* does not mean ‘trade unionism’ and *revoliutsioner po professii* should not be translated as ‘professional revolutionary’ (Lih 2008: 433-489). Following this discussion of the misrepresentations in textbook interpretations, Lih offers an alternative translation of Lenin’s work in question, with the nuances that standard definitions fail to capture. It is particularly noteworthy that the word *konspiratsiia* refers to a general notion of ‘secrecy’ and does not translate to ‘conspiracy’, and thus cannot be easily interpreted as an endorsement of a cell-like, hierarchical party structure (Lih 2008; 36). Also, *tred-iunionizm*, in the view of the writer, cannot be seen as a sum of activities associated with trade unions, but rather suggests an “ideology that urges the workers to limit themselves to trade unions” (Lih 2008: xiv). Looked at with this definition in mind, there is a continuity between the distinction of the theoretical movement and working class movement, with the proviso that one is not necessarily conducive to the other but can even impede its translation into revolutionary praxis. In fact, ‘trade-unionism’ and ‘Social-Democracy’ are palpably diametrical opposites, insofar as the latter is a politically explicit expression of the working class movement. This tenet of Lenin’s approach is bolstered with an empirical reading of Russian realities. This can be seen in the passages regarding the difference of domination and consent between the Russian and Western European ruling classes; while the former exercises blunt coercion, the latter resorts to a “method of deception, flattery, fine phrases, promises by the million, petty sops, and concessions of the unessential while retaining the essential” (1962a: 63-64).

It would be a hopelessly unsupported assertion to assume that Lenin had a monolithic approach to political practice, given that after the October Revolution, despite the vagaries of the Civil War, he suggests a different practice of political power that constitutively involves initiative from below and, importantly, outside of the party. This sensitivity towards continual reinterpretation of the vicissitudes of the conjuncture can be glimpsed in the article *Purging the Party*, written in 1921 (1965a). Here Lenin remarks that the aid of suggestions from non-party member workers has been a vital aid for the execution of the purge, as this provided a unique perspective and involved the wider population in the reconstitution and renewal of the party without making direct incursions towards their livelihood. Another implication of this quaint remark is that Lenin came to believe that the party’s monopolization of political life would have detrimental consequences on its organic grounding in the working class and wider society. This also goes counter to claims that Lenin had an elitist, positivistic rule of the party’s leading cadre as a vision of the Soviet political regime. On the contrary, the nullification of the Soviet under a state-party fusion was a troubling prospect. This last point may be said to have been inversely confirmed with the demise of the Soviet Union, as the state absorbed all functions of the Soviets and marginalized them to a degree that they became more or less symbolic shells.

Lenin had been livid with the social democratic parties' support for their states in the First World War, and sought to release the Communist movement from its moorings by reviving a conception of the state with a distinct class character (1917). The incentive to go to war was the interest of the nation-state, and Lenin emphasized that such interests are bound up with those of the ruling classes and flatly contradict those of the majority. Thus, Lenin believes, the task of the proletarian revolution was to establish a state which would exercise the dictatorship of the majority, upending the rule of the minority. Bensaïd mentions that a "libertarian Leninism" can be arguably deduced from Lenin's *State and Revolution*, insofar as libertarianism is conceived as a "sensitivity" as opposed to a clear political standpoint (2005: 169). While this may be a slight exaggeration of the malleability of both libertarianism and Leninism, there is nevertheless a grain of truth to this statement. It seems unfair to charge Lenin with taking definite sides in reified dichotomies of state-society, and economic-political. Rather, Lenin's programmatic question of 'What is to be done?' has a wider, perennial importance for Left-wing praxis of all sorts. In fact, it is worthwhile risking the suggestion that Lenin's theory can be capitalized on when it is conceived of as a strategic assessment of the goal of establishing control by the producers of the produced. Moreover, while the place of the state is pivotal in Leninist tactics, it is misleading to read Lenin with a blinkered view of discipline and spontaneity. The alleged statocentrism of Lenin is belied by the political history of Bolshevism, a party and a movement at once that expanded due to its "porosity to the event" and ability to think with originality (Badiou 2005).

'Unorthodox' Departures

'Well then, would you like to travel through the country collecting bills for the merchants? That would improve your health.' 'No, I would prefer to be doing something else.' 'How then would going as a companion to Europe, to entertain some young gentleman with your conversation, —how would that suit you?' 'Not at all. It does not strike me that there is any thing definite about that. I like to be stationary. But I am not particular.' 'Stationary you shall be then,' I cried, now losing all patience, and for the first time in all my exasperating connection with him fairly flying into a passion. 'If you do not go away from these premises before night, I shall feel bound— indeed I am bound—to—to—to quit the premises myself!' I rather absurdly concluded, knowing not with what possible threat to try to frighten his immobility into compliance. Herman Melville, *Bartleby the Scrivener* (2012: 32)

The Bartleby character in Melville's short story represents the utmost extreme of non-compliant resistance, to the point that he is indifferent to the question of whether he is resistant. This act of 'preferring not to' has a disarming, and from the perspective of the ideology of industriousness and accumulation, an outright threatening subversive edge, noticed by theorists of anti-power and non-compliant resistance. Importantly, it embodies pure negativity in that it is an answer and a lack of answer at once. Bartleby is a subject, with a forceful impact on his boss (and his sanity), but nevertheless manages

to avoid identification, and does not give his boss a hint of his biography by refusing to choose even active resistance. The phrase “I would prefer not to”, as Deleuze notes, is grammatically correct yet sounds like a quaint way to refuse a request or command (2006: 68). The ‘preference’ is clear, attesting to Bartleby’s agency, but it is unknown what is rejected, and in this way he circumvents power by refusing to meet the powerful – the defining, and by definition oppressive, entity – on its own grounds. For Žižek as well this is a truly critical act, in that it clears the way to a kind of action unbound from societal frames of collective action and the established coordinates of political struggle (2006: 342).

At the same time, Bartleby’s ‘politics’ also depend on antisocial withdrawal, which has a tinge of self-righteousness to its refusal of taking previous paths of resistance while assuming that this refusal to participate, in an obscure way, helps to alleviate social malaise. That is to say that this may well be a beginning point for a novel form of the expression, or non-expression, of discontent. Yet it has to be recognized that after his death, Bartleby is solely remembered as a historical curiosity, if remembered at all.

An alternative interpretation is that the boss symbolizes revolutionary organization while Bartleby represents society. The boss’s exasperation echoes a typically disillusioned, cynical ex-Marxist refrain that the state of compliance and totalitarian capitalism is beyond salvation, and revolutionary endeavour should be discarded or drastically scaled down. The autonomist strand of Marxism would not object to the former, but would reject the latter, countering that the current impasse signals the inability of contemporary radicalism to identify ruptures embedded in the daily reproduction of capitalism. While autonomism maintains that class differentiations and class composition should be considered in tandem with class struggles, and that these should be vigorously reinterpreted to dispel illusions in the established forms of political struggle, Holloway’s anti-power paradigm that merges the negativity of the Bartleby character with the hopeless positivism of the boss takes this reinterpretation to an extremely non-definitional, inarticulate revolutionary practice. In the following discussion, the autonomistic influences on Holloway will be outlined, leading to an appraisal of the anti-power tendency.

The Autonomist Challenge

Autonomism emerged out of distrust towards the industrial working class and its traditional organizations. In particular, the complicity of the socialist and communist mass parties of Italy with mainstream politics raised the need for sweeping theoretical regeneration. Added to this was the party’s monopoly of Gramsci’s legacy, and the discord between the communist parties and theoreticians who were barred from engaging in mass politics and began to reconsider the revolutionary subject and goals of struggle. This departure from dogmatized Marxism-Leninism recognized that capitalist production had taken on a post-Fordist form, spanning - in Virno’s view- the “totality of

social production" (2004: 61). Capitalism was redefined as not solely a combination of the market and private property, but a form of organizing labour.

In the period of reflection beginning with the journal *Quaderni Rossi* in 1960s, Panzieri, Tronti and Alquati seized on this insight and developed it into a theory of the "mass worker" and a sociological investigation of "class composition". Incorporating this viewpoint into its methodology, these terms were first used by Alquati (Alquati 1962, Turchetto 2008: 286-289). Tronti was then the first to sever the Gordian knot between the factory and society, and postulated a "social factory" with class antagonism seeping into every pore of society, making class distinctions arbitrary and redundant. This could be better understood with reference to the works of Pasolini, who paints a picture of Italian society where the cosmopolitanism of heterogeneous ways of life are undermined by homogenizing market compulsion. Class distinctions are blurred to the extent that there is no meaningful difference between the Left and the Right, despite the persistent *partitocrazia*: Schechter thus rightly points out that Pasolini anticipated the "Berlusconi phenomena" (Pasolini 1987; Pasolini 1990; Schechter 2010: 147).

This state of affairs would indicate a normalcy more sinister and reified than the vivid political struggles of the first half of the twentieth century; fascism, while abhorrently suppressive, revealed its inability to subordinate society to the state and could not efface regional diversity. Tronti elaborates that society as a whole becomes an "articulation of production" (1966; 1962: 20). This takes place in two conjoined yet contradictory processes where production in the factory transitions to a process of valorisation as products are circulated in society, scraps of production making their way into consumption patterns. This is akin to the way that nowadays enterprises use their consumer base as a marketable product in itself, social media users voluntarily creating content for platforms engineered by social networking companies. Consequently, extending the digression, it is easy to see why 'slacktivism' - expressing concern for a social issue by the click of a mouse - does not alleviate social stratification but could aggravate it, as they fulfil the interests of those that profit from this action.

Tronti conjectures that the adaptability of the capitalist organization of labour is conditioned by working class militancy, claiming that the working class has not left the historical stage since 1848 (1964: 1). This is an inversion of class perspective where the notion of the class is reconstructed, looking further than the outside appearance of its movement and recognizing that it forces capital to make definite choices by non-compliance. For Tronti this is the embryonic foundation of new organization (1964: 3). This means that there is a vast repository of fragments of struggle that escape the trained eyes of rank-and-file revolutionaries and industrial workers from long lines of political tradition. Accordingly, Tronti see the 'mass worker', the layer of the working class with little organized experience or political tradition, lacking skills and often originating from impoverished rural communities, as the potential agent of revolutionary change, as it is not bound by institutions that place fetters on spontaneity (Wright 2002: 107).

This leads to a number of interrelated conclusions. The conditions of capital lay in the hands of the worker, and the working class exists independently of official political processes and formalized institutions of political power. This means that smashing the state does not necessarily involve the working class, and conversely, its capture does not inevitably diminish the power of capital (Tronti 1965). Consequently, Tronti espouses the ‘Strategy of the Refusal’, of work, of capitalist development, to act as a bargaining partner in terms of the capital relation. The working class develops within interstices of capitalism, yet is independent from its political initiative, which implicates a radical critique of Marxist organizations. The function of the party is to identify instances of refusal, and instead of prefiguring the future by positive construction, to supply “practical means for the destruction of present society” (1980: 33). Participating in the capitalist totality maintains the system, whereas it could be disarmed through intransigent refusal, which is taken to an austere negative point in the theory of Holloway.

Holloway’s Negativity

In the neighbourhood assembly, during the uprising in Argentina ten years ago, an elderly lady spoke up and said that she had lost her dog. The political activists objected that that was not on the agenda. But the assembly organized a search for the dog, and found it. That is communism. That is the possible world of the future. John Holloway (2012)

Holloway’s theoretical positions synthesize Adorno’s negativism with autonomist theoretical interventions (Holloway, Matamoros and Tischler 2009; Holloway 2002; Holloway 2009a, Holloway 2009b). The principal shortcoming of autonomism is that it does not go far enough in its decentralization of the political subjectivity accorded to a particular section of the working class, and this class is defined prematurely and positively as an identity, lapsing into a sort of sociological study of class composition that yields debilitatingly closed identities. The contradiction between capital and labour has a diffuse and fluid nature for Holloway, fracturing society at the minutest level of the individual, thus exerting a dissolving pressure on human creativity while distorting the outlines of class struggle and composition beyond recognition. In this regard, the Adornian refusal of positive identity and disdain for the Hegelian upward spiral introduces non-identity to dialectics, providing a starting point for Holloway’s “scream” as a negation of the wrong world (Adorno 1966: xx; Holloway 2002; Jarvis 1998, 148-174). Based on this criticism of “positive autonomism”, Holloway proposes an understanding of the working class as a negation of capitalism and a perpetually “anti-working anti-class” (2009b: 98). The ubiquity of capitalist relations implicates a corresponding ubiquity of negations, which reveal a revolutionary impulse that can never be fully assimilated: “Insubordination is a central part of everyday experience, from the disobedience of children, to the cursing of the alarm clock which tells us to get

up and go to work, to all sorts of absenteeism, sabotage and malingering at work, to open rebellion, as in the open and organized cry of ‘¡Ya basta!’” (2002: 150). The definitional slipperiness of Holloway’s revolutionary agents and courses of action allow the writer to identify negativity as the wellspring of resistance, grounded in human creativity, and to decry revolutionary “recipes” (2002: 213-214). However, unlike Adorno, Holloway doesn’t espouse theoretical detachment from political practice; he retains the necessity for a negative dialectic while arguing that fissures of negation should be deepened (2009a: 16).

Holloway reminds the reader that the perspective of negativity has practical implications, which are expanded in the controversial work *Change the World Without Taking Power: The Meaning of Revolution Today* (2002). This book has a curiously non-linear form, beginning and ending with the author’s admission that the subject ‘we’, who derives strength from resisting definition, also does not know how to bring about transformation. The lack of such certainty, however, is performatively portrayed as a strength of the Left; nothing is set in stone, and stasis is cracked by the anti-dogmatic, questioning strain of the revolutionary impulse. Thus, for Holloway, the “scream” or the “No” is first and foremost an experiential, instinctive rejection (2002; 2005). Crucially, this experience is pre-rational and in a certain sense ‘raw’, it does not embody a reasoned critique but simply sets off a critical venture with the ecstatic realization that one is not where one wants to be. This point also brings Holloway close to the motivation of critical theory to capture the discrepancy between the perverse surface reflection and the underlying potentiality that belies it (Horkheimer 1937). Holloway takes the argument further, saying that the systematization of the denial in terms of social scientific frames of Marxian theory dull its unpredictably subversive edge, and most of all the Leninist position of directing social discontent and revolt into singular and preconceived projects is a paragon of this fault.

Holloway claims that the capture of state power is the ultimate aim, regardless of whether to wield it for egalitarian purposes or to dismantle it afterwards, underlying the assumptions of Marxist theoreticians of various stripes since the nineteenth century (2002: 11). The statocentric paradigm abstracts the state from social relations where it should be regarded as a node in the web of social relations. This way he claims to represent the nature of the state without conceptual reification. It is a similar case for the question of power. Particularly in our day and age, it is much more diffuse and practiced by a broad range of actors in conjunction with the state; be it banks or nongovernmental organizations, not to mention social actors that espouse the identities heaped on them by the system such as abusive husbands, sociopathic bankers and the like. Consequently, even if the state was once the focal point, this is no longer the case. The project of recovering self-autonomy central to the communist horizon is eclipsed and corrupted by the counterproductive goal of “state sovereignty”, which falls far short of delivering social transformation and space for the expression of individuality (2002: 16).

As the arguments regarding the reproduction of power and the maintenance of the state form suggest, the viable line of action left for revolutionary practice is the deepening of the negation of societal norms and patterns of oppression; for instance, taking up laziness is a thoroughly political statement insofar as it disrupts habitual social flows (2002: 24). The distinction between forms of practice in their exploitative and emancipatory norms, and that between positivity and negativity, lies in Holloway's concepts of "power-over" and "power-to", where the former suggests the incapacity to do, and requirement of doing on behalf, while the latter implies a capacity inherent in self-sufficiency (2002: 29). This step takes Holloway in the direction of privileging power relations over and above relations of production and distribution as an overdetermining aspect of social life, which decentralizes and trivializes the project of capturing state power. The alternative for Holloway is the recovery of power-to, as a means to drive power-over, which in capitalist societies appears as the appropriation of the surplus value and exploitation of labour power, out of the historical scene. The practice of human creativity in a non-compulsory and self-realizing manner is a necessarily anti-capitalist act.

The revolutionary subjectivity implicit in Holloway's defence of the process in place of stasis, and revolt in place of revolution is the extension of negative enfranchisement to a wide range of collective and individual actors. To this can be added the denunciation of the disenfranchisement of ready-made templates and strategic viewpoints bent on introducing consciousness from without. Such ubiquity and indeterminacy accorded to revolutionary agency is rooted in Holloway's refusal of classification and identification, blurring the distinction between capital and labour, state and non-state, as well as the objective and the subjective. In a chapter devoted to the legacy of Engels in the interpretations of Marx after his death, Holloway contends that positivistic categorizations have been illegitimately integrated into Marxism, reducing dialectics to natural law and mechanic historical teleology (Holloway 2002: 119-121). The solution for the theorist is to dispose of notions of objectivity in order to appreciate the subjective nature of capitalist reproduction, as a daily and constant struggle between labour and capital as opposed to impersonal duplication of capitalist social relations. The expectation for the 'objective conditions' to mature, and the pretension for 'objective' knowledge, have been detrimental to political struggles in the past. The actuality of revolution with a lower case 'r' is overlooked, and the spontaneity of grassroots uprising is antagonistic to Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. Participation in mechanisms of political power infuses the institutional logic of the status quo into progressive struggles and weighs them down, hierarchizing the impulse for change and 'nationalizing' the scope of political contestation.

Anti-power, on the other hand, is an "inarticulate non-subordination" that challenges the existence of power as such and is indifferent to whether it is in the 'right' hands. For this reason, Holloway claims, revolutionaries should not be afraid to pose questions, and should refrain from imposing answers. 'Revolution?' with a question

mark is more liberatingly open-ended, and nomadism and exodus more disarming than foreclosed discussions on 'The Revolution' and disciplined, dominated dissent, which is misguided if it is 'guided' at all.

Holloway's Conceptual Slipperiness and Practical Indeterminacy

The theory of revolution as a rupture in time is an historically apposite testimony of the creative tension inherent in the historical materialist paradigm and critiques of linearity. Here Holloway relies on the 'simultaneity of the non-simultaneous': Bloch's theory of "nonsynchronism" explains that the Now is enmeshed in aspirations of the past and anticipation of the Not-Yet (1991). This view rejects linearity and accumulation of revolutionary struggle, maintaining that the future may be inscribed in the present, but it cannot be achieved by retrogressive cultivation of the achievements and iconic figures of the past; Holloway claims that it is necessary to "plough over the bones of the dead", in such a way that they would continue to fertilize current struggles without domineering over them (2011). Cutting across oft-repeated and self-evident maxims of social democratic renunciation of socialism and versions of Leninism that border on attempts at historical re-enactment, Holloway's theories have rekindled interest in 'pristine' readings of Marx distanced from his successors, and provoked a crucial debate. However, while seeking to represent such a pristine Marxism, and the example of the Zapatista community that figures prominently in the anti-power paradigm, Holloway also does violence to conceptual sensitivities involved in the collectively shaped framework of Marxian theory.

Criticism of a historical necessity and a self-evident notion of gradual progress where a naïve belief that crises, distress and social upheaval will lead to improvement of living standards and personal and collective freedoms, has been a topical theme even during the time of Marx's writing. Well into the twenty-first century among the theorists that Holloway charges with an uncritical optimism and excessive positivistic influence from Engels, such as Lukacs and Korsch - not to mention Gramsci - have been grappling with the role of agency and its place in the structural background. Additionally, the historical development of the Soviet Union and its authoritarian turn continues to be seriously scrutinized by taking into account an analysis of political economy. While it may be contested and discredited, as may all scientific theories which have provisional explanatory power, Trotsky's theory of the degenerated workers' state, for instance, does not solely rely on the theoretical deviation, but emphasizes the burgeoning bureaucratic apparatus over and above the organic institutions of the working class, and the historical context of capitalist encirclement, as a factor in the rise of Stalin (1937). Now, Holloway defends that precisely this sort of sophisticated explanation is the precursor of reifying history and presenting the present as a quasi-natural culmination of processes leading up to it. Be that as it may, this reduces historical complexity to theoretical deviation, which has a bearing on the way actors operate but

cannot dictate their course of action. For this reason, it appears that the proverbial baby of political economy is thrown out with the bathwater of economic determinism. Lenin and Gramsci would have themselves objected to stage-based conceptions of history and in fact problematized the residual determinism of the Second International.

On the other hand, a prospective historiography of the 'No', and the connections between the flames of resistance in Chiapas and in Rojava are hard to articulate if one is to remain faithful to the open framework of negativity outlined by Holloway. More problematically, as Bensaid has pointed out, Holloway offers a literalist reading of the Zapatista discourse as the only legitimate one, whereas there may be more to Zapatista discourse than an abhorrence of state power of all sorts, as the organization of civil society may be deemed the primary task of a more protracted struggle (2005). Besides, it is also open to interpretation whether the leadership in the EZLN constitutes a 'vanguard' of sorts, a question that should not be brushed aside by taking declarations to the contrary at face value (Bensaid 2005; Acaroglu 2015). As the persistence and florescence of autonomy in the Chiapas community testifies, the instance of refusal is indeed hard for capitalism to assimilate, but at the same time it could be countered that such refusals, and their subsequent mollification, provide a sort of venting mechanism to capitalist reproduction, which produces the refusal through the destructive dynamics embedded in it. The Temporary Autonomous Zone, as advocated strongly in the work of Bey and main lines of anarchist thought, should not be written off as the theorization of defeat in advance, but at the same time their deficiency in making a large dent in the overall flow of capitalism should be seriously scrutinized (Bey 1991; Zizek 1999: 233). In addition, the richness of state theories in the corpus of Marxism have been illegitimately lumped into a monolithic block, as it is dubious that even Lenin would approach the issue with simple functionalist assumptions of the state's disposability to serve popular interests in place of private ones. As a matter of fact, this was the bifurcation between the social democratic and communist parties' views on the limitations of state power and the prospect of socialist transition.

Also, for Holloway, it is the experiential and pre-rational nature of the refusal that, by definition, cannot be captured in the classificatory net cast by the (Marxist) theoretician. At the same time, however, Holloway conveniently avoids differentiating between emancipatory and alienated action, or between post-identitarian and identity-based struggle. In a single march of statism throughout history Holloway claims that identity-based movements have had an equivalent role in determining the stakes and terms of struggle, which does not stand up to historical examination. The history that is condemned to the categories of the oppressor is indeed a retroactively narrated one that compartmentalizes and attempts to impose a yardstick of progress on the ruffled texture of time. That said, memory and history, especially of the periods of lull between ruptures, are contested territories. A similar point can be made for the relevance of the state in struggles for egalitarian change. The fantasy of making a clean sweep of the past is comparable to that of nullifying the state as a terrain of contested hegemony. Unless

this kind of historic accumulation of struggle and their guidance towards novel methods of organization are seized on, there is no apparent reason why the raw, uncouth scream would not be channelled towards reaction. After all, historically, far-right movements have also mobilized a significant portion of the disenchanting, dispossessed and marginalized population by driving wedges along threads that link discrimination and capitalist exploitation. It is clear that Holloway also recognizes this, but he nevertheless explains away this potentiality in favour of faith in an intrinsic drive against fetishization and alienation.

The Lacuna in the Debate

The alternative to the aforementioned problematique of articulated goals and targets and their disenfranchising effect on the insubordinate scream of refusal is to cling to the negation and deepen the cracks in the texture. Yet it appears that the assumption that such programmatic articulation and a clearly stated goal of the capture and defusing of state power is unfounded given the way that non-nationalistic conceptions of state sovereignty can be coupled with, and also amplify, the voice of the spontaneous creativity of organs of decision making from below. While it is inopportune to delve into the socioeconomic changes in the country here, the unfolding Bolivarian Revolution suggests that there is a liminality, no matter how fleeting or fragile it may be. This is because it is hard to imagine that Chavez would have received the mass support to carry out sweeping reforms in the political regime without the confidence of the impoverished social base, and the crucial activity of the Bolivarian circles that operate autonomously to tend to day-to-day problems in the community without the hindrance of gentrifying neoliberal incursions, checked by the government. In this sense, the sovereignty of a coalition of popular classes runs counter to 'nationalism' as an ideology of latent ethnic discrimination and assimilation.

It is still significant, however, that the sense of practical experimentation refreshes social movements and makes the diffuse practice of hegemonic power apparent, rendering it a vulnerable target. That being so, it is worthwhile considering ways to bridge the gap, or at least suggest a bricolage to consider the tasks of building collective power and the capture of the state as continuous exigencies. The contrast between radical possibility and realistic power contestation is in itself fluid and lacks a conceivable frame of reference, therefore a porosity between anti-power practices of alternative social construction, and the more 'traditional' methods of participation with a view to establishing accountability and inclusion in the existing institutions of power. Developments in one sphere are not impenetrable to those in another, and the complexity of social life demands an approach that goes beyond the dichotomy and extracts the germination of new ways of arranging social life through and beyond capitalist frames of sociality and hegemonic understandings of 'common sense'.

The Gramscian Bridge

Gramsci's journey through the communist movement testifies to the enduring relevance and urgency of debates revolving around the party-form and the tension between coherent directionality and multipolar modes of organization. A brief sketch of the theorist's political life would suffice to show this. Gramsci was acquainted to Marxism through the philosophy professor Labriola, who had turned to Marxism - what he called the 'philosophy of praxis' - at a later age. Gramsci would substitute the same expression for Marxism, allegedly to evade prison censors (Fiori 1990). However, this nomenclature also discloses Gramsci's understanding of Marxism as a vivacious philosophy. His mundane and political life unfolded hand in hand with the workers of Torino, where he became convinced of the necessity of a Leninist party after having witnessed the decomposition of the factory councils, and took part in the founding of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), also regularly participating in the Comintern. Throughout his long imprisonment, Gramsci expanded his horizon and took up interests in general Italian history and cultural heritage alongside contemporaneous issues of Marxist theory. This provided a unique insight into the Bolshevik revolution, where the vulgar determinism of the Second International was shattered by revolution in a peripheral country, proving the importance of the 'accidental' and the capacity of organizing in a manner that proceeds with the actuality of revolution in mind, without delaying the topicality of socialism to the future (Buci-Glucksmann 1980: 365).

By historicizing the Russian experience Gramsci could provide concrete strategic suggestions by way of integrating Leninism to the Western European context. This aspect of Gramsci's thought also allows for, and involves as a constitutive element, contingencies that remind one that history has more imagination than it is believed. The Althusserian 'continent' of history is an apt metaphor as the topography and climate of different points on a continent are formed by disparate yet connected geographical histories. These histories involve interlacing dynamics of progress and reaction. The contradiction invokes for Gramsci a dialectical understanding of the muted impulse for progress, oftentimes left unfulfilled, submerged in the bleakness of a continent dominated by fascism. The intensity of fascist repression inversely attests to the formidable potential of mass mobilization through and against the status quo. Accordingly, darkness is dependent on its opposite, and this is reason for the hope encapsulated in the pages of *L'Ordine Nuovo*: Pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will.

Gramsci's Political Evolution: The Union, the Council, and the Party

The turbulent period following the end of the First World War was one of mass displacement and discontent, along with rekindled hopes for a social transformation as a way out of the impasse. Gramsci was particularly impressed by the Bolshevik

revolution and the wave of factory occupations in Italy, which provide ample opportunity to observe the dynamic between the unions, councils, the party and society in general. These discussions are short articles mainly written in the newspaper *L'Ordine Nuovo*, founded by a group in the Italian Socialist Party. They provide an insight into Gramsci's intellectual and political evolution and prefigure some of the concepts that take shape in later writings, reflecting vividly the strenuous period of national and individual interregnum. In an article written in 1919, Gramsci shows a sensitivity towards the "new proletarian culture" taking shape as a process of building modes of existence that can withstand the unpredictable fluctuations of the labour market and weave the masses of working people in an association antithetical to the vicissitudes of life in the maelstrom of capitalism (1919b). This accords a due importance to workers' own methods of organization, and anticipates the concept of hegemony.

There is a progression in the 1919-1920 writings towards ruminations on the relationship between the unions and councils, where Gramsci appears to decisively break from a syndicalist orientation. In the view of the theorist, there is an important caveat to struggles waged by the union that is grounded in the capitalist mode of production. That is to say, unions can neither inspire, nor capitalize on, revolutionary aspirations since they operate according to the logic of competition, but on behalf of the wage labourers. Essentially, they seek to secure more concessions from the employer on a not so level playing field, merely inverting the positive and negative signs without reaching beyond class compromise that leaves exploitation untouched, if it does not intensify it in the long run (1919d). On the other hand, the council is organically cultivated as a reaction of the working class against the system as a whole, in the sense that it is indifferent to the question of gaining leverage within the system while providing the example of an ontologically distinct way of organizing social relations. This is the reason Gramsci finds unions to be incapable of maintaining a sustained progressive direction over the working class movement; its members solely figure as wage-labourers selling labour-power as a commodity, as well as being bound by forms of legality that blunt radicalization. However, that does not mean that the unions should be discarded as a terrain of struggle, nor the state, simply because they embody institutional hierarchies that cannot possibly channel revolutionary energy towards radical social rearrangements. Gramsci instead sees the union as a counterweight to the spontaneity and unpredictability inherent in the council, and envisions a mutually reinforcing relationship where the council retains a foot in the formal side of industrial relations through the union, while "(...) the revolutionary character of the Council influences the union, as a reagent dissolving its bureaucratism" (Gramsci 1968: 40).

The apparent dissolution of the wave of factory occupations impelled Gramsci to consider the proletarian party, as a living example of the socialist transition from the wage-labourer to producer, more seriously. Thus while a workers' democracy and a post-capitalist popular culture needs to be identified and cultivated, the party also has

the role of combining discipline and freedom for the moment of impasse where political power in the hands of the working class has effectively marginalized that of the bourgeoisie and only the self-defence of the bourgeois state remains (Gramsci 1968: 45, 48). Gramsci is in all likelihood aware of the definition of ‘dual power’ advanced by Trotsky which has henceforth become a staple formulation in Marxist theories of revolutionary rupture; the stage in the pre-revolutionary situation where the ascendant class has concentrated state power in its hands, but the official apparatus of government remains in the hands of the previous ruling class (Trotsky 2000: 274-287). The concept of dual power is particularly important as it is a wedge issue between anti-power and statocentric theories. Gramsci’s position regarding the duty of the party is characteristically difficult to categorize neatly, as he states:

“(T)he duty of the existing Communist nuclei in the Party was to avoid particularistic obsessions (the problem of electoral abstentionism, the problem of the constitution of a ‘true’ Communist Party) and instead work for the creation of the mass conditions in which it would be possible to resolve all particular problems as problems in the organic development of the Communist Revolution” (1968: 46).

In sum, Gramsci’s understanding of the party is a multifaceted institution that encourages situations that go beyond the capitalist-liberal parliamentary framework while maintaining in sight the objective of dismantling the political core of ruling-class power, the state. Otherwise, Gramsci surmises, the achievements towards socialist transition will be thwarted with a tremendous reaction by propertied classes (1968: 51).

The Advent of Hegemony

Hegemony could be loosely understood as the ensemble of social expectations, commonly held beliefs, behavioural patterns and ways of picturing reality that maintain and replicate the existing mode of production.¹ This wide definition admittedly begs some qualification in order to have an explanatory power over the way that social processes unfold the way they do. For instance, it is often considered ‘common sense’ to

¹ Buttigieg notes that the temptation is to “reconstruct” the final text of the *Prison Notebooks*, which is in reality thoroughly fragmented and constitutively incomplete, with a view to supporting a preconceived viewpoint (2011: 63). Plucking content from its context is a dubious method of reconciling Gramsci with a current of the Marxist or Post-Marxist Left, be it Eurocommunism or radical democracy. But at the same time, Thomas is correct in maintaining that there is still a “fundamental coherence” to Gramsci’s writings. While interpretations may differ, current usage of the concept of hegemony has taken on a rather narrowly superstructural meaning, finding resonance in cultural studies and tending towards a position of anti-political resistance (2009: 46). The interpretation proposed here is just that, an interpretation, but it nevertheless seeks to show that Gramsci’s focus on hitherto neglected domains such as culture and serious reflection on the role of the intellectual intend to bend the stick in the opposite direction of direct conquest of political power and working class belligerence.

go into higher education with utilitarian purposes, particularly with the ongoing commercialization of universities, towards occupations that will be lucrative but not necessarily fulfilling in an intellectual or emotional sense, potentially embodying negative 'externalities' on communities and the environment. This is inculcated by family, circle of friends, and so on while being promoted by mainstream media and the valorisation of individuals who are deemed to be adept at climbing the ladder to financial success. At the same time, universities are administered in an increasingly technocratic fashion, ascribing priority to subjects that improve marketability and boast higher employability. This is aggravated by the fact that less funding is available for research on humanities and philosophy, as these are not immediately profitable investments. All things considered, a wide variety of social actors contribute to this process of encouraging lines of work closely tied to capital accumulation and profit maximisation. There are two purposes for this hypothetical digression. Firstly, to highlight the sociological versatility of the concept of hegemony as a series of mechanisms of consent enmeshed in social relations, and consequently raise the prospect of counter-hegemony as a consciously intransigent project with political implications. And secondly, to problematize the civil society and state divide with respect to the domains of consent and coercion. It is important to note that contrary to Anderson's argument that Gramsci's divergent applications of hegemony evince an indecision, this reluctance from definitional clarification is indeed intentional, as it derives its explanatory power precisely by not staking out a definite application and by incorporating the concrete situation under consideration.

Hegemonic culture undergirds the entire process sketched above, but this seems to impose on social investigation a blinkered view of intensities of various hegemonic practices and modes of thought, without broaching the question of sites of hegemonic influence and institutional differences in the production of hegemony. The sovereignty of the state relies on a mixture of force and consent, the latter never prevailing too much over the former. Regarding the site of the production of hegemony, Gramsci deliberately refrains from using the indicative, at times identifying civil society outside of the state, or political society, and at others suggesting a particular "political hegemony" emanating from the state (1971: 507). The state has an interest in the spontaneous and voluntary subordination of the citizenry, and paradoxically it is in a more dominant position to exercise authority directly when not compelled to reveal its coercive core. That being so, the conventional wisdom of instrumentally taking up a university education with future prosperity in mind attests to the way that the state is often minimally involved in social affairs where there is an organically ingrained cultural disposition within civil society. The sturdiness of hegemony can be likened to a rut on a road, a long deep track made by the repeated passage of unchanging patterns of behaviour. Extending this metaphor, it is evidently discomfiting to envision a way out of the rut, as it at least partially involves acting against one's own immediate interest at times of solidified capitalist normalcy, particularly when it is able to afford society a

modicum of civil liberties and welfare. That being said, this insight also fosters a sensibility towards the nuances and minutiae of social livelihood where, in a way similar to Holloway's treasured anecdotes of spontaneous acts of subversion betraying the underlying revulsion from fetishization and commodification integral to the human psyche, it becomes necessary to combine a struggle for hegemonic influence in the cultural domain without losing sight of the state monopoly of force and formidable repository for the suppression of such efforts. In other words, the pervasive cultural dominance unique to the structure of bourgeois political power should not eclipse the determinant coercive core. In fact, Gramsci suggests firstly that the bourgeoisie may continue to exercise cultural hegemony after its political authority has been overthrown, but also states that the proletariat cannot gain cultural prominence before the assumption of power (1971: 57-58, 268). As Schecter explains, hegemonic struggle takes place among multiple and adaptable vectors, going beyond simplistic notions of domination and exploitation; hegemony is always "ethical-political, economic-political and political-cultural" (2010: 153-154).

Gramsci's grasp of bourgeois political power recognizes that the state apparatus is sturdier than most Marxist accounts had claimed, withstanding economic fluctuations and relying on spontaneous and free consent from dominated classes. To consolidate political power, a social group must not only prevail but also maintain leadership (Gramsci 1971: 57-58). Leadership over the social formation as a whole is made up of "intellectual and moral" content as opposed to a singular viewpoint, as in a consensus around particular statements (Bobbio 1988). For that reason, the state is a historical combination of dictatorship and hegemony, or coercion and consent, where the precise nature of the combination is a product of social struggles (Gramsci 1971: 239, Öncü 2003: 305-310). Strategy, then, needs to be based on an accurate identification of this makeup of political power, depending on an assessment of the state's vulnerability to a direct incursion and an understanding of civil society as a more or less fortified redoubt, where a protracted, defensive strategy may be more sensible.² The political conceptual repository indicates an increased sharpness in Gramsci's strategic imagination, quite possibly inspired by the pessimism of the intellect with the fascist assumption of power, aimed at the capture of the state as a precondition of social and cultural revolution.

The Modern Prince for Gramsci is the reproduction of the Leninist party model that derives its strategic orientation from the environment of its own genesis. Gramsci's

² The ostensibly militaristic turn in Gramsci's rhetoric on state theory and political power should not be taken at face value as a retraction from explorations of societal experimentation and struggles for industrial democracy and social autonomy, but should not also be dismissed as an influence of the acuteness of social struggle and conflict in Russia and Western Europe. That is to say, while clandestine work and stringent discipline in organization were prerequisites for the existence of the Bolsheviks, Leninism in Western Europe needs to be construed with its own conditions in mind.

positions regarding the vanguard party, however, also suggest a nuanced vantage point. For instance, Gramsci categorically denies that apart from general Marxian tenets, the social struggle and party formation cannot have readymade recipes. Regarding the intra-party division of labour and centralism, Gramsci acknowledges that representation and a degree of verticality are bound to appear naturally between the rank-and-file who do not necessarily devote a significant chunk of their daily lives to party tasks, the organizers and mobilizers, and finally the intermediary elements that maintain the link between these two layers. The point is that a party cannot inspire and expand with solely one of these types of membership, which shows a typically Gramscian emphasis on the dynamism generated through the fertile contradiction between disparate entities (Buci-Glucksmann: 152-153). For Gramsci, the dynamic or lack thereof is an important factor in the prospect of bureaucratic degeneration. If higher ranking members take on a functionary and administrative role without organic leadership credentials and accountability, and seek to keep their positions intact by retrospectively justifying their actions, there is no longer a 'moving' centre to speak of. On that account democratic centralism entails

(...) a "centralism" in movement—i.e. a continual adaptation of the organisation to the real movement, a matching of thrusts from below with orders from above, a continuous insertion of elements thrown up from the depths of the rank and file into the solid framework of the leadership apparatus which ensures continuity and the regular accumulation of experience. (1971: 189).

The sole justification for leadership is to render feasible conditions for the overthrow of such institutional hierarchy in revolutionary organization. Of course, this emancipatory break cannot be consciously planned and executed, but to borrow from Dean's vocabulary, the "Communist Horizon" guides the steps taken in actuality (Dean 2010: 6-8; Bosteels 2011: 236).

All things considered, Gramsci's conception of the party appears to be at once fluid, adaptive and disciplined, with the purpose of capturing state power through war of position or manoeuvre. It stands as a nodal point in the triangular encounter between mass movements, collective creativity, and the communist movement. In this sense, Gramsci develops a theory of the political party that is universal yet innovative, taking into account the politics of the masses and that of the communist currents. By broaching the theme of hegemony in depth and in a systematic manner, as well as adhering to a stringent historical and sociological rigor, Gramsci restores historical materialism with explanatory power and dispels notions of the self-evident inevitability of historical progress in favour of an eventuality, dependent on the conscious will and intellect of human agency. While the solutions that Gramsci suggests for the problematique of the civil society-state or that of the boundaries between coercion and consent may give rise to further complications, based on the questions raised through Gramsci's writings, it is

fair to say the theorist remains a contemporary in the confused and demoralized political climate of the early twenty-first century.

Hegemony as a Detour from Lenin to Holloway

To transcend the nostalgic and doctrinaire nature of the debate of statocentric and anti-power theories, it is important to bend the stick in the theoretical direction in order to set the controversy straight. It is useful in this respect to invoke Balibar's theory of transition in economic, political and ideological layers (1990). The first layer indicates the structural change in the mode of production, the second signifying a revolutionary transition in the configuration of state power, and the third pertaining to the obstacles confronting the change of mind set that a fundamental social transformation entails. Balibar's intriguing thesis is that there is a 'dislocation', or *decalage*, that delineates the different components of the social formation. This suggests that there is a non-correspondence between these layers and politics takes place in a domain of dislocation. In this sense, Holloway's argument that the state is a nondescript node in a web of reified social relations is vindicated to the extent that it traverses these layers without dominating their historical development.

Political action in a wide-conceived sense that is not delimited by the legality of institutional practices, but capitalizes on the potential of social discontent across a range of platforms can maintain a line that pushes the boundaries of statocentric political life. A Left-wing politics does so in a way that facilitates the involvement of the larger population, thereby redeeming social autonomy and engendering a process of the "withering away" of the state (Lenin 1917). This is also where Gramsci's theory of hegemony could be deployed, clarifying the state in more discernible contours than Holloway's abstraction, and retaining the significance of non-state actors operating in different circuits of power. This is because, due to its robust capacity to elucidate the terrain of class struggle grounded in the material relations of production, Marxist political economy can define where anti-capitalist struggle should focus and why.

The Paris Commune, for Marx, was an expansive political form that maintained recognizable structures of decision-making and direction while evading a crystallized vertical practice of power. In a similar way, Gramsci's Modern Prince also postulates an expansive party-form that could incorporate the transmitted methods of organization from the Commune experience while aligning itself more explicitly with the international communist movement. These forms do not indicate a preconceived structural façade but provide main guidelines that may foster dynamism and continual rejuvenation in contemporary radical politics. While critiques of verticality are on point, especially regarding its demoralizing and corrosive effects, an absolute horizontality that is the upshot of main lines of anti-power theories also has problematic aspects. A leadership structure and procedure of transition is not detailed and agreed upon as a precondition for organized political activity, and thus the emergence of 'unofficial'

vanguards minus the accountability is not out of the question. For instance, the occupation a factory – or perhaps in contemporary conditions a park – can build network of solidarity and a vestige of what post-capitalist life might look like, but ultimately the larger part of its participants cannot unmoor themselves completely from their day-to-day jobs and responsibilities. In this case, it is more or less inevitable that a close-knit inner circle who have more time and energy to devote to the collective effort would emerge, and it may in due course begin to act as a *de facto* self-referential vanguard of sorts. For this reason, it seems to be more productive to consider ways of organizing within a frame of ‘diagonality’. A multiplicity of political forms is thus a crucial ingredient of all progressive political movements as they exhibit the limitations and strengths of different ways of organizing, in the short and long run, and coming to grips with state repression. For this reason, however, a shift in mindset towards a socialistic brand of common sense that is open-minded towards heterogeneous forms is urgently needed. An understanding of hegemony that is not solely directed towards countering the preponderance of the ideas of the ruling class in wider society, but also aimed at an introspection of Leftist models of organization hitherto taken for granted would thus provide a healthy dose of criticism and opportunity for the construction of popular power as a joint effort between the socialist and working class movements.

Turning to the working class movement and its organizations, the autonomists charge the unions of the industrial workers with becoming complicit in the functioning of the capitalist organization of labour, and therefore the mass worker has an uncorrupted potential for revolutionary spontaneity. This then leads to the conclusion that the capture of state authority by mobilization along conventional paths will only lead to an ultimate assimilation the closer to power it gets. However, while these autonomistic approaches profess a sharp differentiation from Lenin, they seem to share a similar diagnosis regarding trade union consciousness. That is not to claim that the difference is only semantic. Lenin’s writings on the labour aristocracy, the portion of the working class in developed countries that act on the incentive of their respective countries’ success in the global market, could deepen the critique of the trade unions as inadequate agents of working class emancipation (1968: 615-616, 635).

As alluded to earlier, Gramsci comments extensively on this external imposition of the union-form and the capitalist underpinnings of union aims. The crucial connecting thread between Lenin, Gramsci, the autonomist current and Holloway, however, is the qualitative transformation from wage-worker to producer. Any notion of proletarian dictatorship has to consist of the activity of producers who have broken free from the bondage of wage-labour and begun to exercise authority on what they produce and how they produce it. Further unpacking this transformation, and employing Balibar’s layers of transition, it is clear that an overnight nationalization of productive assets and increased productivity is by no means a guarantee that social ownership and industrial democracy will operate lockstep with state ownership. The ideological and political

layers, notwithstanding their blurred boundaries, also bear heavily on this transition, and they can eventually undermine the economic transformation.

Summing up, the primacy of connecting political and economic struggles and working for their fusion in the Soviet that was paramount to the Bolshevik line combines aspects of war of position and war of manoeuvre as seen in Gramsci's theorization of political action. However, based on the historical circumstances that Leninism developed in, a war of manoeuvre had been the precondition of enacting multi-layered transitions from capitalism. Whereas in Western Europe, Gramsci recognized the diffusion of the state's functions and its capacity to not have to actively prevail. He thus suggested that it would be more productive to engage in a protracted war of position, in order to cultivate a native proletarian value system to counter bourgeois hegemony and propagate class consciousness. It is not suggested that a war of position should constantly reiterate the ultimate goal of combatting the state, but it incorporates more of an exploration of alternative ways of collective social existence within and beyond the confines of the market and capitalist interest. The war of manoeuvre, on the other hand, provides an outline to the persistence of proletarian subjectivity and marginally influences the content of its culture, political or otherwise. Without this overarching coherence against the focal point of domination and power, however, it is hard to see how a solely counter-hegemonic project of autonomy could propel itself forward without counterpoising its autonomy to the main lever of power that facilitates its confiscation. That is to say, the war of manoeuvre equips the construction of alternative societies with a certain political sting that anti-power theories are bereft of.

Conclusion

The Fable of the Beaver:

(The beaver, pursued by trappers who want his testicles from which medicinal drugs can be extracted, to save his life tears off his own testicles.) Antonio Gramsci (1971: 223)

This investigation has taken a long stride stretching from the political praxis of Marx and Engels, to Lenin's theory of the vanguard party, to the autonomistic precursors of 'anti-power' theories and the 'Bartleby politics' of Holloway. In doing so it has traced an intellectual history of the development of the anti-power paradigm and contrasted it with the 'traditional' modes of political contestation involving the capture of state power. In outlining this process of gradual mistrust of conventional political styles and actors, Gramsci's social and political theory serves as a nodal point which indirectly bridges the two inclinations, when the concept of hegemony is deployed to highlight the inadequacy of taking sides in what is essentially a false dichotomy. This is because the

goal of capturing state power -while fetishized among some tendencies as the panacea to all vestiges of social malaise- appears to relentlessly impose itself on the way to the phase of post-capitalist configuration of class society. *Pace* anti-power theorists, the decision to keep the apparatus at a distance is in itself an acknowledgement that the political centre of gravity, when push comes to shove, is grounded in the state and its vast disposal of coercive and ideological arsenal. For this reason, establishing a continuity of the construction of alternative society must inevitably address the question of state power if it is to avoid being crushed or co-opted, becoming a historical curiosity or source of romanticized and defeatist Left nostalgia. That said, as the notion of hegemony and the need for a conscious cultivation of counterhegemonic praxis against the prevalent class reveals, the state draws its amniotic fluid from the fortification of civil society around it. Thus the impulse towards overcoming capitalism cannot be assimilated to a project of conquest. On the contrary, discipline without domination, and the combination of freedom and unity of action in an adaptive, expansive party-form appears to be the order of the day.

To use an admittedly formulaic expression, a narrow target and a wide front remains as a burdensome yet vital undertaking. A unified front nourished by various political forms and prefigurative practices, yet coherent enough to maintain the proverbial ‘trappers’ in close sight, remains incomplete and continues to colour the horizon of emancipatory politics. The unreachable utopian horizon gives the struggle its bearings, or as Galeano puts it: “I approach two paces, she goes two paces further away. I walk then paces and the horizon moves back ten paces. However much I walk, I shall never reach it. How does utopia help us? That's how it helps us: to walk” (1993: 230).

Bibliography

- Acaroglu, O. 2015. *Redefining Hegemonic Discourse: The Nature of Leadership in the EZLN. Democracy and Participation in Latin America* Brighton.
- Adorno, T. 1966. *Negative Dialectics*, New York, Seabury Press.
- Alquati, R. 1962. *Composizione organica del capitale e forza-lavoro alla Olivetti. Quaderni Rossi: 62-98.*
- Althusser, L. 1971. *Philosophy as a Revolutionary Weapon. New Left Review.*
- Anderson, P. 1976. *The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci. New Left Review: 5-78.*
- Badiou, A. 2005. *Metapolitics* London, Verso
- Balibar, E. 1979. *In: Althusser, L. & Balibar, E. (eds.) Reading Capital*

- Balibar, E. 1990. Les apories de la 'transition' et les contradictions de Marx. *Sociologie et sociétés*, 22: 83-91.
- Balibar, E. 2012. Lenin and Gandhi: A Missed Encounter? . *Radical Philosophy*
- Bensaid, D. 2005. On a Recent Book by John Holloway. *Historical Materialism*, 13: 169-192.
- Bernstein, E. 1907. *Evolutionary Socialism* (Online). Available: <https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/bernstein/works/1899/evsoc/>.
- Bey, H. 1991. *T.A.Z.: Temporary Autonomous Zone* New York Autonomedia
- Bloch, E. 1991. *Heritage of Our Times* Berkeley, University of California Press.
- Bobbio, N. 1988. Gramsci and the Concept of Civil Society. In: KEANE, J. (ed.) *Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives*. London: Verso.
- Buci-Glucksman, C. 1980. *Gramsci and the State* London, Lawrence and Wishart
- Budgen, S., Kouvelakis, S. & Zizek, S. 2007. Introduction: Repeating Lenin. In: ZIZEK, S. (ed.) *Lenin Reloaded: Toward a Politics of Truth*. Durham: Duke University Press
- Buttigieg, J. 2011. Introduction. In: BUTTIGIEG, J. (ed.) *Prison Notebooks Volume I*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Cole, G. D. H. & Filson, A. W. 1951. *British Working Class Movements. Select Documents 1789-1875*, London, St. Martin's Press
- De Tocqueville, A. 1896. *The Recollections of Alexis de Tocqueville*, New York The Macmillan Co. .
- Dean, J. 2010. *The Communist Horizon* London, Verso.
- Deleuze, G. 2006. Bartleby, or The Formula. *Essays Critical and Clinical*. London Verso.
- Deleuze, G. & Parnet, C. 1987. *Dialogues* London, Althone Press.
- Engels, F. 1848. Marx and the Neue Rheinische Zeitung (1848-49). *Marx Engels Collected Works* Moscow Progress Publishers.
- Engels, F. 1872. *Report on the Alliance* (Online). Available: <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/iwma/documents/1872/hague-conference/bakunin-report.htm> 2015).
- Engels, F. 1892. *Socialism in Germany* (Online). Available: <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1892/01/socialism-germany.htm> 2015).
- Fiori, G. 1990. *Antonio Gramsci: The Life of a Revolutionary* London, Verso.
- Galeano, E. 1993. *Palabras Andantes*, Buenos Aires Catalogos.

- Gramsci, A. 1917. *The Revolution Against 'Capital'* (Online). Avanti! Available: <https://www.marxists.org/archive/gramsci/1917/12/revolution-against-capital.htm> 2015).
- Gramsci, A. 1919. *Unions and Councils L'Ordine Nuovo*. 1919 ed. Turin.
- Gramsci, A. 1919a. *Worker's Democracy* (Online). Turin: L'Ordine Nuovo. Available: <https://www.marxists.org/archive/gramsci/1919/06/workers-democracy.htm> 2015).
- Gramsci, A. 1919b. *The Conquest of the State* (Online). Turin: L'Ordine Nuovo. Available: <https://www.marxists.org/archive/gramsci/1919/07/conquest-state.htm> 2015).
- Gramsci, A. 1919c. *Unions and the Dictatorship* (Online). Turin: L'Ordine Nuovo. (Available: <https://www.marxists.org/archive/gramsci/1919/10/unions-dictatorship.htm> 2015).
- Gramsci, A. 1919d. *Unions and Councils* (Online). Turin: L'Ordine Nuovo. (Available: <https://www.marxists.org/archive/gramsci/1919/10/unions-councils.htm> 2015).
- Gramsci, A. 1921. *The Parties and the Masses* (Online). Turin: L'Ordine Nuovo. (Available: <https://www.marxists.org/archive/gramsci/1921/09/parties-masses.htm> 2015).
- Gramsci, A. 1968. Soviets in Italy. *New Left Review*, 1, 28-58.
- Gramsci, A. 1971. *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, New York International Publishers
- Hardt, M. & Negri, A. 2001. *Empire*, Harvard Harvard University Press
- Hobsbawm, E. 1962. *Age of Revolution: 1789 - 1848*, New York, Vintage Books.
- Holloway, J. 2002. *Change the World Without Taking Power: The Meaning of Revolution Today* London, Pluto Press
- Holloway, J. 2005. No. *Historical Materialism*, 13, 265-284.
- Holloway, J. 2009a. Negative and Positive Autonomism. Or Why Adorno? Part 2. In: Holloway, J., Matamoros, F. & Tischler, S. (eds.) *Negativity and Revolution: Adorno and Political Activism*. London: Pluto Press
- Holloway, J. 2009b. Why Adorno? . In: Holloway, J., Matamoros, F. & Tischler, S. (eds.) *Negativity and Revolution: Adorno and Political Activism*. London: Pluto Press
- Holloway, J. 2011. "*Drive your cart and your plough over the bones of the dead*" (Online). (Available: <https://libcom.org/library/drive-your-cart-your-plough-over-bones-dead-john-holloway> 2015).

- Holloway, J. 2012. *After Capitalism: 'In the anti-worlds of daily struggles the world beyond capitalism is to be found'* (Online). (Available: <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/video/2012/aug/14/after-capitalism-john-holloway-anti-worlds>).
- Holloway, J., Matamoros, F. & Tischler, S. (eds.) 2009. *Negativity and Revolution: Adorno and Political Activism*, London: Pluto Press.
- Horkheimer, M. 1937. Traditional and Critical Theory. In: O'Connell, M. (ed.) *Critical Theory: Selected Essays* New York: Continuum.
- Jarvis, S. 1998. *Adorno: A Critical Introduction*, New York Routledge.
- Johnstone, M. 1967. Marx and Engels and the Concept of the Party. *Socialist Register*, 4: 121-158.
- Lenin, V. 1902. *What is to be Done? Burning Questions of our Movement* (Online). (Available: <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/download/what-itd.pdf> 2015).
- Lenin, V. 1917. *The State and Revolution*, London Penguin.
- Lenin, V. 1962a. The Peculiar Nature of the Tactics Which Follow From the Above. *Lenin Collected Works* Moscow Foreign Languages Publishing House
- Lenin, V. 1962b. The Revolutionary-Democratic Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the Peasantry. *Lenin Collected Works*. Moscow Foreign Languages Publishing House
- Lenin, V. 1965a. Purging the Party *Lenin's Collected Works* Moscow: Progress Publishers.
- Lenin, V. 1965b. The Dictatorship of the Proletariat *Lenin's Collected Works* Moscow Progress Publishers
- Lenin, V. 1968. *Notebooks on Imperialism* Moscow Progress Publishers
- Lih, L. 2008. *Lenin Rediscovered: What is to be Done in Context*, Leiden, Brill.
- Lukacs, G. 1970 *Lenin: A Study on the Unity of His Thought*, London, New Left Books.
- Luxemburg, R. 1986. *Social Reform or Revolution*, London Militant Publications.
- Marx, K. 1871. *The Civil War in France* (Online). (Available: <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1871/civil-war-france/> 2015).
- Marx, K. 1875. *Critique of the Gotha Programme* (Online). Moscow Progress Publishers Available: <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1875/gotha/> 2015).
- Marx, K. 1968. *Selected Works* Moscow Progress Publishers
- Marx, K. 1969. *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (Online). Moscow Progress Publishers Available: <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/ch01.htm#007> (Accessed 05-11 2015).

- Marx, K. 1969. *Theses On Feuerbach* (Online). Moscow Progress Publishers. Available: <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htm> (Accessed 20-05 2015).
- Marx, K. 1990. *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, London, Penguin.
- Marx, K. & Engels, F. 1847. Rules of the Communist League. *Marx Engels Collected Works*. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
- Marx, K. & Engels, F. 1872. *Preface to the 1872 German Edition of the Manifesto of the Communist Party* (Online). (Available: <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/preface.htm#preface-1872> 2015).
- Melville, H. 2012. *Bartleby, the Scrivener: A Story of Wall Street* Radford, VA, SMK Books
- Öncü, A. 2003. Dictatorship Plus Hegemony: A Gramscian Analysis of the Turkish State. *Science & Society* 67: 303-328.
- Pasolini, P. P. 1987. *Lutheran Letters* Manchester Carcanet Press.
- Pasolini, P. P. 1990. *Scritti Corsari* Milan, Garzanti.
- Schechter, D. 2010. Gramsci's Unorthodox Marxism: Political Ambiguity and Sociological Relevance. *Modern Italy*, 15: 145-159.
- Thomas, P. 2009. *The Gramscian Moment: Philosophy, Hegemony and Marxism* Leiden, Brill
- Tronti, M. 1962. La fabbrica e la società. *Quaderni Rossi*.
- Tronti, M. 1964. *Lenin in England* (Online). Turin: Einaudi. (Available: <https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/it/tronti.htm> 2015).
- Tronti, M. 1966. *Operai e Capitale* Turin, Einaudi.
- Tronti, M. 1980. The Strategy of the Refusal *In: Lotringer, S. & Marazzi, C. (eds.) Autonomia: Post-Political Politics*. New York: Semiotext(e).
- Trotsky, L. 1937. *The Revolution Betrayed*, New York Doubleday
- Trotsky, L. 2000. *The History of the Russian Revolution Volume I: The Overthrow of Tzarism* (Online). Available: <https://www.marxists.org/ebooks/trotsky/history-of-the-russian-revolution/ebook-history-of-the-russian-revolution-v1.pdf> 2015).
- Turchetto, M. 2008. From 'Mass Worker' to 'Empire': The Disconcerting Trajectory of Italian Operaismo. *In: Kouvelakis, S. & Bidet, J. (eds.) Critical Companion to Contemporary Marxism* Leiden Brill.
- Virno, P. 2004 *A Grammar of the Multitude* New York, Semiotext(e).

Wright, S. 2002. *Storming Heaven: Class Composition and Struggle in Italian Autonomist Marxism* London, Pluto Press.

Zizek, S. 1999. *The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Center of Political Ontology*, London Verso.

Zizek, S. 2006. *The Parallax View* Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.