Countermeasures for timing-based side-channel attacks against shared, modern computing hardware

Reza Montasari, Richard Hill, Amin Hosseinian-Far, Farshad Montaseri

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

There are several vulnerabilities in computing systems hardware that can be exploited by attackers to carry out devastating Microarchitectural Timing-Based Side-Channel Attacks against these systems and as a result compromise the security of the users of such systems. By exploiting Microarchitectural resources, adversaries can potentially launch different variants of Timing Attacks, for instance, to leak sensitive information through timing. In view of these security threats against computing hardware, in a recent study, titled “Are Timing-Based Side-Channel Attacks Feasible in Shared, Modern Computing Hardware?”, currently undergoing the review process, we presented and analysed several such attacks. This extended study proceeds to build upon our recent study in question. To this end, we analyse the existing countermeasures against Timing Attacks and propose new strategies in dealing with such attacks.
Original languageEnglish
JournalInternational Journal of Electronic Security and Digital Forensics
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 20 May 2018

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Hardware
Side channel attack

Keywords

  • Side channels
  • timing attacks
  • hardware attacks
  • channel attacks
  • digital investigations
  • countermeasures.

Cite this

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Countermeasures for timing-based side-channel attacks against shared, modern computing hardware. / Montasari, Reza; Hill, Richard; Hosseinian-Far, Amin; Montaseri, Farshad.

In: International Journal of Electronic Security and Digital Forensics, 20.05.2018.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

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